This is an infenma1 r e p d intended primarily for internal or limited extefnal distribution. The opinionsand conclusions stated are those of the author and may or may not be those of the Laboratory.
DISCLAIMER
Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Images are produced from the best available original document.
i i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The climate in which government managers must make decisions grows more complex and uncertain. All stakeholders -the public, industry, and Congress -arc demanding greater consciousness, responsibility, and accountability of programs and thcir budgets. Yet, managerial decisions have become multifaceted, involve greater risk, and opera te over much longcr time periods. Over the last four or five decades, as policy analysis and decisions became more complex, scientists from psychology, operations research, systems science, and economics have developed a more or less coherent process called decision analysis to aid program management.
The process of decision analysis -a systems theoretic approach -provides the backdrop for this paper.
The Laboratory Integrated Prioritization System (LIPS) has been developed as a systems analytic and risk-based prioritization tool to aid the managcmcnt of the Tri-Labs' (Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia) operating rcsourccs. Prcliminary analyses of the effects of LIPS has confirmed the practical bencfits of decision and systcms scicnccs -the systematic, quantitative reduction in unccrtainty.
To date, the use of LIPS -and, hcnce, its value -has been rcstricted to resource allocation within the Tri-Labs' operations budgets. This rcport extends the role of risk-based prioritization to the support of DOE Total Quality Management (TQM) programs. Furthermore, this paper will argue for the requirement to insti tutionalizc an evolu tionary, decision theoretic approach to the policy analysis of thc Department of Energy's Program Budget.
The paper is organized into four distinct sections: Section 1 develops the background for this paper.
Section 2 provides a brief description of LIPS and TQM.
Section 3 defines technical unccrtainty, discusses the sources of bias while making decisions under unccrtainty, and identifies the rational and ethical basis for integrating risk-based prioritization into TQM. Section 4 summarizes the requirement for a quantitative, decision-theoretic approach to policy analysis to enhance current TQM programs. Decision Theory. The challenges that face government leaders have never been more complex. All stakeholders -the public, industry partners, and Congressare demanding more accountability and responsibility for our nation's resources.
Certainly the rapid increase in our population, with the resulting demands on finite resources, has played an important role in increasing the complexity of decisions. Another important factor is the accelerating change in the technologies with which we surround ourselves. These technologies are more hazardous and have longer time-horizons than ever before.
Yet, as management complexity has increased, scientists from a variety of disciplines have developed a more or less coherent methodology called decision anaZysis. It is a systems theoretic approach to solving decision problems that was nurtured by scientists i n such diverse fields a s psychology, economics, managemen t science, and operations research.
Most decision theoretic approaches are relatively sympatric (a concept borrowed from ethology implying that each approach is distinct, yet covers the same ground). The basic components of all decision analysis problems include:
A perccivcd nccd to accomplish some ob IC! t i vcs .
Several alternatives, one of which must be sclLxtcxl.
The consequences associated with alternatives arc different.
Uncertainty about the consequences of each alternative.
The Dossible conseauences are not all e' ually valued. tKeeney, 1982, pg. A71
The history and scope of decision analysis can be found in several fine articles which describe decision theory (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981; Keeney, 1982; and, Lopes, 1994 System, Supporting Documentation, 1994, pg. 1-11 LIPS assists n7nnngcrs i n their dccisionmaking by formally combining the assessments of technical experts with the policy judgments of key stakeholders. As a risk-based prioritization process, LIPS helps managers make rational choices in the midst of technical, economic, and political complexity -and, perhaps most importantly, in the midst of uncertainty.
Organizational effectiveness. During the past half-century, professionals from the field of organizational effectiveness developed a class of methodologies generically called Total Quality Management (TQM) . Techniques such as TQM were designed to promote organization efficiency by focusing workers and managers on the feedback loop dcfincd by: (a) customer expectations, (b) customer However, there is no single TQM process or program (Bennett, 1994) . Yet, there is common ground. What most successful TQM programs seem to share mutually is a requiremcnt to measure system processes. assessment of the product, and (c) customer satisfaction. See Figure 1 .
Purpose. Though LIPS and TQM are both systems theoretic in nature, there has been no formal attempt to integrate the two. The purpose of this paper is to examine the theoretical foundations of risk-based prioritization methodologies, like LIPS, in context with modern organizational effectiveness programs, like TQM.
AN INTRODUCTION TO LIPS & TQM
In the following subsections, I will describe LIPS and TQM briefly. These descriptions will provide the context for the main body of the paper -a discussion about the use of quantitative policy analysis in the reduction of managerial uncertainty, and the thorough integration of decision sciences into TQM.
These discussions will be restrictcd to the Department of Energy (DOE) Defense Programs (DP) oversight responsibilities to the Tri-Lab (Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia) operations budgets. The term "Operations" budget rcfcrs to those overhead activities which do not directly participate in bringing funds into the laboratory, but are essentid to the success of the laboratory.
Description of LIPS
Because of changing national imperatives, monies allocated to DOE DP have many constraints. In an effort to make DP operations as cost effective as possible, one forward-thinking DP manager initiated a program to ensure logical, equitable, and systematic use of its resources by the National Laboratories, with initial emphasis on the Tri-Labs' operating budgets.
In response to the programmatic requirement to map overhead expenditures onto operating requirements, the Tri-Lab organizations developed a systematic prioritization procedure to help managers make rational, optimal choices about their budgets. The Tri-Lab organizations reported the details of their collaboration 
Decision Theory and Multiattribute
Utility Analysis is well documented in the scientific literature (von Ncumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Kccney and Raiffa, 1976; Fischhoff, 1981; Gardenfors and Sahlin, 1988; and, Clemen, 1991) . Also, see the Postscript at the end of the paper for current perspectives on MUA.
Summary. LIPS is a systems analytic and a decision theoretic method using multiattribute utility analysis and is designed to reduce technical uncertainty during the policy analysis process. LIPS reduces uncertainty by using a logical and orderly process for prioritizing managerial risks and maximizing utility of organizational goals.
Overview of TQM
The term TQM was coined in 1985 by the Naval Air Systems Command to describe the Command's newly adopted approach to conducting business (Bemowski, 1992) . The U.S. Air Force's approach to TQM was based explicitly on Japanese-style management practices. Since then, TQM has come to refer to any set of management practices -developed before or after 1985 -which advocates systems analytic management practices and emphasizes that customer and employee satisfaction, not profits, should be the primary motivation for conducting one's business. This paper does not go into depth concerning various TQM approaches to business management. There is a special reference section that contains specific citations directing interested readers to some of the primary sources. I have included specific citations concerning the application of TQM to various federal government agencies. See Bennett (1994) 
Summary
In the preceding overview section, I have provided a foundation for the integration of risk-based prioritization and TQM .
I characterized LIPS as a logical, orderly approach to the reduction of risk and uncertainty during policy analysis. Risk-based prioritization is rooted in the quanfificafion of expert technical opinion concerning system performance. In the case of LIPS, the process has been limited to red u ci ng risk surrounding the Tri-Labs' operating budgets.
TQM was described as an organizational cffcctiveness tool that can take on a variety of "looks," depending upon the style of management. However, over the last ten years, TQM has not only become wcdded to systems sciences, but has adopted some of the basic principles of operations research. However, to date, decision science techniques, such as riskbascd prioritization, have not been integrated cxplicitly into the application of TQM to budget policy analysis.
I n the next section, I will (1) examine how decision science uses risk-based prioritization as an indispensable tool to reduce uncertainty during policy analysis, and ( 2 ) evaluate the value of risk-based prioritization as a TQM tool.
RISK-BASED PRIORITIZATION & TQM
To fully appreciate the value of riskbased prioritization and how it might be incorporated into TQM, I believe we need to examine the naturc of uncertainty, and how mangers must deal with it as they analyze policy decisions.
Technical Uncertainty
History of uncertainty. Throughout this century, authors have documented the hazards with which we surround ourselves (American Engineering Council, 1928; Pressman, 1928; Herring, 1989; and, Schlager, 1994) . These selected compendia capture the failures in our science and technology-from the mundane to the catastrophic.
We assume, of course, that failures in technology were not intentional. C' ,iven this, I pose the question: What a priori certainty existed -in the minds of the designers and managers -that technology would not fail us? Surely, developers must have gone about some process to reduce the frequency and consequences of their systcms failing.
In many cases, historians and analysts have in fact documented how scientists and policy makers dealt with certainty in technical knowledge. (For reasons of logic, it is uncertainty, rather than cerfainfy, which must be analyzed. Throughout this paper, I will be dealing with uncertainty and failure rather than certainfy and success .I Academicians have written a number of excellent papers and books about technical uncertainty and the role it plays in policy analysis. See, for example, Morgan Henrion, and Morris, 1981; Clark, 1984; Funtowicz, and Ravetz, 1984; Morgan, Morris, Henrion, AmaraI, Rish, 1984; Perrow, 1984; Roberts, 1990; Shrivastava, 1992; Sagan, 1993; and, Shrivastava, 1994 . Many of the ideas in the following subsections have been synthesized from these authors.
Epistemology of uncertainty.
Before examining what role technical uncertainty plays in management sciences and policy analysis, I believe i t is important to cxamine the fundamental nature of uncertainty. It is in the epistemology (the study of knowledge) of uncertainty that we can appreciate the subjective nature of our physical world -as well as the foundation for the quantification of subjective es tima tes.
As the aphorism goes, "The only certainty is that nothing is certain (Pliny the Elder, c. 23-79 AD)." However, with the modern age of science, we have become particularly arrogant concerning our knowledge about our physical world. We have cvcn come to the belief that there are such truths as physical constants! Some of the sciences, like physics and chemistry, have developed a list of concepts -the physical constants -which are said to exist in the physical world, independent of our subjective knowledge about them. See Landolt-Bornstein (1992) for the current list of physical constants.
Setting solipsism aside, the fact that physical constants exist may, or may not, be true. For some scientists, it would be a bitter pill to swallow if they had to acknowledge the impermanence of the physical cons tan ts : "It would be disheartening to any real scientist to feel that an acce ted value of any physical constant woupd never a ain be changcd. The most gcncral and particular -is its neverending changc. But what one must not ovcrlook is the fact that it is the probable valuc of any given constant that changes, not its actual value. A bclief in any significant variability of the constants of nature is fatal to thc spirit of science, as scicncc is now understood." (Birge, 1942, pg. 90 Fisher's view of the physical constants probably represents the othcr extreme from Birge. And, as may be expected, there is a more moderate view which represents a compromise:
"Strictly speakin 7 , the actual error of a reported vaIue ($a constant) is usually unknowable. Limits to this error, however, can usually be inferred -with some risk." (Eisenhart, 1968, pg. of aIZ measuremenfs. That is, whether we are measuring the speed of light or the mass of an electron, some private, subjective experience must be exercised in the measurement process.
What role subjectivity played i n creating the variability we observe in nature was not always so clear. In 1927, deBray (as reported by Birge, 1942) seriously concluded, based on the historical trend, that c, the speed of light, was linearly decelerating at the rate of some four km/sec/year. At that rate, the speed of light would be zero in 75,000 years! Just a fcw years later, in 1934, Edmondson (again, as reported by Birge, 1942) concluded that dcBray's calculation was in error by demonstrating that c was not decreasing, but had a damped, sinusoidal period of approxima tcly forty years.
Having roundly criticized deBray and Edmondson, Birge concludes his discussion of c with what was to be a bit of premature confidence:
'Thus, aftcr a long and, at times, hectic history, thc valuc of c has at last settled down into a fairly satisfactory 'steady' state. The samc thing can now be said of the othcr important constants." (Birge, 1942, pg. 101 ) A mere nine years later, c had again shifted by more than 2.4 standard deviations of Birge's estimate of uncertainty (Eisenhart, 1968) . I t would take almost two more decades before a "solution" to the seemingly ever changing value of c was agreed upon: ... According to this definition, the speed of light can now no longer be measured." (Landolt and Bijrnstein, 1992, pg. 3-49. Italics addcd for cmphasis.)
What is glossed over is that the meter is measured with respect to how far light travels in one second. (Never mind that the second is measured in terms of how long it takes light to travel one metcr.) In other words, the speed of light is defined in terms of the speed o f light! Without a doubt, this has to bc (to borrow from Islam) the "mother" of all scientific tautologies. Using different technologies, David Pritchard (as reported by Holden, 1994) is taking an analogous approach in defining mass with respect to an "unchanging" standard. The two types of cosmic time that Norman and Setterfield refer to are atomic time (based on the period taken for an electron to move around once in its orbit), and dynamical time (based on the period taken for the earth to make one complete orbit of the sun). Furthermore, they believe that the data show that "the two clocks measuring cosmic time are running at different rates" (1987, pg. 3) . Briefly, to Norman and Sutterfield, if the Theory of Relativity is to believed, then we must give up our cherished notions of the objective permanence of the physical constants.
The unsettling notion concerning the impermanence of the constants has even been extended to the subjectivity of the fundamental forces of nature. Those who have attempted to take the Theory of Relativity that one final stepquantumization of gravity, and its unification with the other forces -have found that the mathematics of space-time may bring us to a Kantian dead end -the subjectiveness of the cosmos.
"Ultimately, the biggest barrier to thc construction of a theory of quantum gravity may not be the mathematics, but the interpretation of the mathematics .... Since we cannot know the true value of the physical constants, how are we to sepnratc true error and bias? Muller (1979) contends we should not. I agree.
"Veteran ravity theorist Chris
For example, let us assume we can never know the real value of random error.
Furthermore, i t is given that we do know the magnitude and direction of systematic error (because i t was subjectively estimated by the scientist). Therefore, Ict u s just deal with error as if it were systematic or biased only -that is, just make a single, albeit complex, estimate of our uncertainty. Henrion and Fischhoff (1986) and Youden (1972) have already shown that this is probably the case anyway. Henrion and Fischhoff (1986) Importantly, because we have somc understanding about what influences our judgment in these settings, we should be able to minimize the magnitude and direction of the error.
Freudenburg (1988). The thesis of
Freudenburg's Science paper is that much of the difficulty in risk management occurs as the result of the perccption that, on one hand, scientists identify "real," technical risks, and, on the other hand, the public perceives risk within an environment of misinformation and irrationalities.
However, the underlying theme of Freudenburg's paper is that judgments in the face of technical uncertainty, whether made by scientists or the public, will be influenced by known psychological and sociological factors. Furthermore, the factors which influence our estimates of unccrtainty can be identified and controlled, at least to somc cxtent. In the following sections, I will discuss how the measurement of uncertainty can be the basis for quantitative methods of policy analysis. In doing so, I will review some of the heuristics of judgment.
Reduction of Uncertainty
Objective & quantitative vs. subjective & qualitative. During casual conversation, we often lump objective with quantitative and subjective with qualitative. In doing so, we can generate a misleading implication about the precision of our measurements.
The point here is that just because something is objective -a concrete, physical object -i t does not restrict us to quantitative, numerical measurements. And, conversely, just bccause somcthing is subjective -a psychologically private, internal concept -it does not restrict us to qualitative, nominal measurement scalcs.
We can qualitatively measure somcthing that is objcctive, or quantitatively mcasure something that is subjective. In both processes, what is important is accuracy (closeness to the true value) and precision (repeatability). As Eisenhart said when he described how to report uncertainty : "A re orted value whose accuracy is entire7 unknown is worthless." (Eisenlart, 1968 (Eisenlart, , pg. 1201 Whether we are measuring a social and psychological process like policy analysis, or a physical phenomenon like the speed of sound through different media, the accuracy of our measurements is not based on the objectivity nor the subjectivity of the phenomenon. In large part, the accuracy is dependent upon the magnitude of our error or uncertainty.
Control of uncertainty. Conclusions of the
classic papers concerning judgment under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972 , 1973 , and 1974 and, Lichtenstcin and Fischhoff, 1977) have, for the most part, gone unchallenged. There are many subclasses of the major influences listed above. I will mention only one or two to provide some insight into how these heuristics and biases influencc our judgments.
Representativeness. Thc
representativeness heuristic relies on how closely a sample, A, resembles the population, B. The more A rcscmblcs B, the greater do we believe the probability is that A comes from B. But, there are welldocumented situations when this rule can fail.
Insensitivity to sample size. Consider the following (Kahncman and Tversky, 1974):
"A certain town, is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45 babies are born each day,and in the smaller hospital about 13 babies are born each day. As you known, about 50 percent of all babies are boys, However, the exact percentage varies from day to day. Sometimes it may be higher than 50 percent, sometimes lower.
For a criod of 1 year, each hospital recor8cd the days on which more than 60 crccnt of the babies born were boys.
h h i c h hospital d o you think recorded morc such days?
The larger hospital (21) The smaller hospital (21) About the same (that is, within 5 percent of each other) (53).
The values in parentheses are the number of undergraduate students who chose each answer."
The correck answer is the small hospital.
The point here is that people tend to believe that a sampling statistic (60 percent) is indepcndcnt of sample size (small or large number of births). In fact, sampling theory dictates, because of smaller variability of a large sample, that we should expect a 10 percent deviation to have a higher probability in a smaller hos pi t a 1.
The misconceptions of chance. The misconceptions of chance bias explains that people expect a purely random stochastic process to bc represented even in short sequences. Again from Kahneman and Tversky (1974) :
"In considering tosses of a coin for heads or tails, for c x a m~~_ R c u p l e regard the sequence H-T-H-T to be morc likely than the sequence H-H-H-T-T-T, which does not appcar random."
People apparently tend to believe that a global process should be represented in a sample of that process. This is, of course, the source of the "gambler's fallacy," that chance is a self-corrccting process, when, in fact, the chance of any given evcnt becomcs more diluted as the process unfolds.
Availability. The availability heuristic refers to the fact that pcople tcnd to assess "the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind" (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974) . The data clearly show that the estimate of the probability of a specific event will be strongly influenced by the number of times an individual has observed that event around them. For example, people's estimates of the occurrence of fire or a specific accident are dependent on how often and recently they have experienced those events.
Adjustment & Anchoring. The anchoring heuristic refers to the fact that pcople tend to estimate the value of something depending on the initial starting value. For example, if people are asked to estimate a sample mean, and are given the 90th percentile, their estimate will be higher than the actual value. Conversely, if givcn the 10th percentile first, they tend to give an estimate lower than the actual value. If they are given the mean first, and then asked to estimate the 10th and 90th percentiles, the probability distributions will be "tighter" than the actual values. This is true for laymen and experts.
The issue of adjustment and anchoring possesses even more complexity than alluded to in the previous paragraph. I n their paper titled "Judged Frequency of Lethal Events," Lichtenstein, et al. (1978) clearly demonstratcd that wc tend to overestimate low frequency events and underestimate high frequency events.
For risk analysts, this is good news and bad news. If we overestimate low frequency events, we would tend to be more conservative. On the other hand, if we underestimate high frequency events, then we would tend to be less conscrvative.
Evcn experts may subject the use offaulf trees to what may be an anchoring bias (Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1978) . Thcy report that experts and laymen alike tcnd to ovcrcstimate the significance of a givcn fault trcc branch, if that branch is dccornposed more than others.
Summary. In this subsection, I have dctailcd some of the fundamcntal concepts about technical uncertainty. As part of the presentation, I discussed the role of subjectivity in estima ting the physical constants. It was shown that uncertainty based on subjcctivc crror may be a major contributor to our cstimatcs of such constants as c. I wanted to highlight thc subjective aspects of measurement, and their contribution to uncertainty, so that we may better appreciate the nature of the uncertainty surrounding judgments of p r ob a b i 1 i t y .
I pointed out that just bccause we wish to measurc a subjcctivc phenomenon quantitativcly, it does not mean that we cannot havc a great deal of confidence conccrning our accuracy or repeatability. However, i t is important that we understand what heuristics and biases we bring to the measurement process. The cognitive, perceptual, and social influences on the judgment proccss can significantly bias the opinions of laymen and experts. The literature conccrning technical uncertainty clearly shows that the direction and magnitude of the biases can be controlled.
Having established a groundwork for understanding uncertainty, I will review some of the basic aspects of quantitative policy analysis. I n following sections, I will discuss how decision analytic tools, such as risk-bawd prioritization, can be integrated into TQM.
Quantitative Policy Analysis
Policy analysis. 1 use the term policy analysis synonymously with such concepts as regulatory and budgetary decisionmaking. That is, policy analysis refers to the general process that managers use to shape the course and direction of their organizations or institutions.
In one of the better treatises on quantitative policy analysis, some of the experts in risk analysis highlighted the importance of quantifying uncertainty during decision-making in the following manner : "Most of the problems which policy analysis must address involves uncertainty ... uncertainty about factual matters and physical reality, uncertainty about future events, and uncertainty about peoples' preferences and values. In some way, all policy analysis must deal with this uncertainty. The most common solution is to ignore it, to trcat uncertainty parameters and models as if they were known with recision. But another approach, whic K is swing increasing application is to try to characterize quantitatively uncertainty in the form of 'subjective' or 'jud mental' characterize one or several peoplcs' beliefs about their current state of understanding." (Morgan, Henrion, and Morris, 1981, pg. 3) probability density functions w E ich I would now like to compare Morgan's, et al. (1981) thought on uncertainty in policy analysis with that of Laplace (1825, as cited by Raiffa, 1970, pg. 274 Fischhoff and Whipple, 1981; Winkler and Sarin, 1981; Morgan, Morris, Henrion, Amaral, and Rish, 1984; Lein, 1992; and, Pat6-Cornell and Bea, 1992 As represen ted in Figure 2 , the process of Risk Assessment (RA) and Risk Management (RM) consists of overlapping activities. In a "tongue-in-check" discussion, Barnes (1994) In her review of the NAS paradigm, in the process of outlining the risk analysis process, Patton (1994) establishes an important perspective for the users of those management decisions.
"A com arably useful, but often overlooled, use of the paradigm represents the vantage point of the recipient of risk assessment information: the paradigm is also a useful aid for receiving, understanding, and mastering risk science information, and for translating that information for others in the communication chain. In this sense, the paradigm empowers the reci ient by offering a diagnostic tool for stulying the science used in the risk assessment mcess or any particular assessment." P Patton, 1994, pg. 375) As we shall see later, the diagnnsfic utility of decision analysis, in contrast to the formal output, provides an extremely important tool which can be used for weighing the significance of the analysis.
Given these observations, we might alter the NAS paradigm to suite our own needs concerning the budgetary decisionmaking process. See the following figure.
As represented in Figure 3 , budgetary policy analysis, like risk analysis, includes overlapping activities (for example, the process of Budget Assessment (BA) and Budget Management (BM) activities). In a "tongue-in-check " description similar to Barnes (1994) , BA and BM activities can be represented as such: The purpose of this paper is not to elaborate these budgetary activities but to dcvelop a decision theoretic perspective of the budgetary assessment process, which in some sense parallels that developed for risk and uncertainty analysis. Such a perspective will include the concerns of the analysts, the managers, and the customers -in other words, the core of a TQM model. Ethics and quantification of uncertainty. Barnes (1994) addressed some of the weaknesses of the NAS risk assessment paradigm. It applies equally and explicitly to our model of budgetary uncertainty analysis: "A perennial chestnut, the issue of adversity of effect (e.g., Which is worse: cancer or development effects?) has withstood all attempts at definitive resolution by the A cncy (the EPA), the NAS, and anyoneck for that matter. At bottom, the question of the relative concern to give to leukemia vs. missing limbs, or reproductive effects vs. stratos hcric ozone deplction appears to be a vaLe judgment to be made somewhere other than in the RA arena. Although such a statement ma be true, it reflects a limitation in the abizty of RA to answer the RM question: What are you goin to do about these two risks?" (Barnes, B 994, pg. 222) Clearly, Barne's "adversity of effect" issue has a parallelism in uncertainty during budgetary policy analysis. For example, an overhead budget manager might ask: Should I spend the public's money on protecting my people from the risk of heart attacks or exposure to radiological contamination? These types of questions prompt us to consider the ethical issues of risk-based prioritization and Total Quality Management.
The literature on the social implications of discoanfing provides a solid platform from which to view the ethical issues of quantitative uncertainty analysis and budget management.
Pate-Cornell (1984) presents a carefully considered discussion of the ethics of discounting. In its simplest form, discounting addresses the following question: What are the future returns on money invested in the present? Again, in the simplest solution to the question, we could apply von Neumann's (1947) axioms of rationality to evaluate discounting's mu1 tiattributes.
In evaluating different avenues of discounting, managers must assess (I 1 the magnitude of their uncertainties, (2) their preferences regarding risks, ( 3 ) the minimum rate of return, or (4) those benefits valued most. Pate-Cornell (1984) While investigating the implications of these questions, Pat6-Cornell (1984) points out that, superficially at least, the notion of discounting implies economy of purpose. She writes:
"...the argument often is not whether or not discounting is appropriate ..., but rather whether or not economic efficiency matters in the decision to be made." (I'at6-Cornel1, 1984, 
pg. 22)
Patk-Cornel1 and others raise ethical issues that directly impinge on how workers perceive managers' risk prioritization processes -and, ultimately, on the quality of workers' performance. See the following for additional insights: Keeler, 1982; Kolb and Scheraga, 1990; Moore and Viscusi, 1990; Robinson, 1990; Scheraga, 1990; Cropper, Aydede, Portney, 1991; Shepard, 1992; Broome, 1994. I n this paper, 1 will not develop fully the ethics of discounting specifically, nor those of other quantitative analytic tools. I will simply state that as risk-based prioritization is developed and integrated into TQM models, managers must carefully consider not just economic efficiency, but also value systems of current and future workers. For, if workers believe that their value systems are not being considered during budgetary policy analysis, then product quality and customer satisfaction surely will suffer.
Is risk-cost-benefit analysis a n appropriate basis for safety The birthright of TQM can be traced to capitalism. Yet, on the surface, the ethics of capitalism are antithetical to the welfare of either the workers or customers.
Capitalism promotes maximizing profits versus costs (which trades stockholders' interests over that of the workers'). Capitalism also attempts to maximize a product's margin (its cost to produce versus its sales price) versus the product's value (worth compared to utility and cost), a trade which favors the stockholders' interests -again over that of customers'.
What TQM brings to the table is that i t inextricably ties the profit motive to the interesfs of workers and customers. TQM promotes a business and management ethic which favors the interests of no single participant of a system. TQM advocates that an organization should measure its own success by how it optimizes (a) the interests of its workers, (b) the value of its product to the customer, and (c) its profits.
The implication of this "TQM Credo" is that we should no longer define success by a unidimensional metric such as profit. TQM would have us define organizational success as a metric with multiple attributes. It follows then, that if we are to measure systematically the success of our organization, we are led to a systems theoretic, decision analytic process such as risk-based prioritization, which uses, as a principal tool, Multiattribute Utility Analysis ( M U A ) .
As I described i n earlier sections, MUA is a systematic process by which dccisionmakers can list the attributes of various alternatives, weight the importance of the attributes using individual preferences or judgments, and come to an equitable, logical decision.
Summary. I n this section, I have closed the argument concerning why a decision analytic tool, such as risk-based prioritization, should be an integral process of TQM.
The ethics model used by TQM has brought about fundamental changes in our perspective of capitalism and, by way of analogy, our perspective of organizational management. The conclusion being that, if during budgetary policy analysis, we were to apply TQM ethics and principles, then we need to systematically consider the interests of all stakeholders -from the public to Congress. One decision theoretic tool that carries empirical consensus in the scientific community is the risk-based prioritization tool called Multiattribute Utility Analysis.
Use of Measurement in Managing DOE Policy Analysis
I n a previous section (3.3), I mentioned Barnes' (1994) comment that one of the problems of risk-based management process is "adversity of effect." The problem, or more propcrly, the dilemma, is excmpl i fi ed by the fol lo wj ng question: "Which is worse, lung cancer or breast cancer?"
In a carefully considered response to Cohen's (1985) paper, "Criteria for Technology Acccptabili ty," Otway (1985) weighs risk assessment and risk managemen t: I would argue that in policy analysis, decision theoretic approaches take up where risk assessment leaves off. This applies equally well to operations budget analysis or the planning of a research program.
The Department of Energy's Defense Program's Office has much at stake in our post-Cold War era of neo-peace, made up of small, low-intensity, regional conflicts. DP must be responsive to Congressional and Military requirements to ensure our Nation's security by maintaining a safe, nuclear deterrent force. Yet, DP must also be responsive to the international peace initiatives to disarm. These burdens must be considered in light of DP's stewardship of future generations' safety from radiological hazards.
As Otway (1985) 
Summary
In the preceding subsections, I have laid the groundwork for understanding technical uncertainty. I examined the role of private, internal psychological processes that enter into making both objective and subjective es tima tes.
I also developcd a budget management model based on the National Academy of Science's risk assessment paradigm. I highlighted the fact that DOE'S "con trolling" documents concerning policy analysis do not provide specific guidance concerni ng budget ma nagcmcnt.
I followed the subsection on documents with a discussion of the ethics of capitalism and management. I pointed out that if TQM is to address policy analysis issues in an equitable fashion, it must follow a quantitative, systematic approach such as risk-based prioritization.
Section 3, "Risk-Bawd Prioritization & TQM," ended with a brief discussion of the value of applying the ethics of TQMusing decision sciences as a backdrop -to the problem of nuclear explosive program policy analysis.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
In the confines of a limited-scope paper, I have dealt with a wide range of issues, while focusing on the paper's purpose:
Examine the thcorctical foundations of risk-based prioritization mcthodologics, like LIPS, in context with modern organizational cffcctivencss programs, like TQM.
The value of risk-based prioritization tools, like Multiattribute Utility Analysis (MUA), is that it can be used to reduce technical uncertainty during policy analysis. The utility of Total Quality Management (TQM) is that i t optimizes the expected utility of a system to all the stakeholders -managers and owners, workers, and customers. The question arises:
Can an MUA tool, such as the Laboratory Integration Prioritization Tool (LIPS), be integrated fully into TQM methodologies?
Technical uncertainty surrounds all nondeterministic outcomes (which includes most decisions we make). Furthermore, decisions we make in the face of uncertainty are influenced by a number of well known heuristics and biases. The magnitude and direction of the uncertainty, or error, surrounding our decisions may be controlled to some extent, given our understanding of judgment heuristics. Risk assessment typically deals with the technical aspects of a management process. For example: "How many fatali ties will technology 'X' produce? Or, will high-consequence technology 'Y' fail in the next year?" Decision scientists designed Risk Assessment (RA) to assist managers i n understanding the consequences of management choices. Risk analysts never intended that RA data be the only data with which a manager made a decision. Somcwhcrc between von Neumann and Morgenstcrri (1947) and the present genera tion of managers and analysts, the notion was lost that R A is an anaZyfic fool -not a decision tool.
To makc "better" policy choices, managers must turn to decision theoretic methods. (The term "better" is used here in the sense that a manager rationally selects an alternative, which optimizes the values and interests of each system stakeholder.) That managers actually do this may or may not be the case. However, the point is that there are decision theoretic tools for policy management upon which there is much technical consensus.
One such decision tool is the MUA called LIPS. It should be remembered that LIPS was initiatcd to make Tri-Lab operations budget policy decisions more equitable and responsive to DOE'S oversight concerns. During the development of LIPS, a new DOE administration began advocating a management philosophy called TQM. TQM brings to the table an ethics base which nccessi tates that managers carefully consider thc interests of all stakeholders.
To this end, LIPS provides a vehicle by which DOE operations managers weigh budget considerations prior to decision making. In this sense, LIPS may be viewed as a tool that supports TQM in general, and budget policy analysis specifically.
I concluded the main body of the paper with a brief argument that MUA may be useful during DP's' program policy analysis process. MUA could bc used to carefully consid er thc mu 1 ti plc, pol i ti ca 1 influences that DOE DP managcrt; must dcal with during annual program budget allocations.
POSTSCRIPT
I -.
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Alternatives to Utility Theory. The term "utility" in MUA makes specific reference to Utility Theory as i t was formulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) . In order to develop a set of tractable mathematical solutions, in its basic form, Utility Theory makes a number of simplifying assumptions.
For example, decision makers are assumed to have complete information about the probabilities and consequences of the alternatives. The theory assumes that the decision makers understand the consequences, compu te the associated probabilities, and then select the alternative that maximizes the utility function. It does not take much to stretch one's imagination and realize that the actual world does not operate in this manner.
I do not point this out to dismiss Utility Theory. The theory is simple to implement, and in many situations approximates actual outcomes.
However, as a sidebar to my discussion of MUA presented in the main body of the paper, I feel i t is important to describe at least one alternative to Utility Theoryor, what is probably the most widely accepted alternative, Prospect Theory (PT). I do this not to promote an alternative to LIPS, but merely for completeness of the paper.
Prospect Theory. In the decade following von Neumann and Morgenstern's book, i t was clear that Utility Theory did not predict all outcomes of human decision making. In 1956, the economist and Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon hypothesized that people do not optimize, they "satisfice."
What Simon tried to account for were the situations in which people act "i r ra t i o na 1 I y ."
The Allais (1953) and the Ellsberg (1961) Paradoxes are typical examples. Briefly, the paradoxes pose probabilistic questions, which force the participants into contradictory behaviors. These conflicting actions demonstrate that people only optimize to a point. Once they believe the solution is "good enough," they stop attempting to rcnch an optimal solution.
Prospect Theory (Kahncman and Tversky, 1979) handles many of the situations that Utility Theory does not.
"Unlike expected utility theory, prospect theory predicts that references will depend o n how a pro!l em is framed. If the rcfcrcncc point is defined such that an outcomc is viewed as a gain, then ... dccision makers will tend to be risk averse .... i f the rcfercncc point is defined such that an outcome is viewed as a loss, then ... dccision makers will be risk seeking." (['lous, 1993, pg. 97) The reader is referred to either the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) paper or to PIOUS (1993) for a more complete discussion of PT. Again, the intent is not to advocate an alternative to LIP'S approach to budget analysis. I felt that i t was important for the reader to realize that the literature does recognize the limitations of Utility Theory, and depending upon the setting, Prospect Theory (PT) may prove useful.
Though much recognition is being given to PT, the reader should be aware that bcuausc i t is much younger, it has not been as thoroughly "exercised" a s Utility Theory. As a result, decision analysts have not completely defined PT's limitations.
